Korean American Institute

Commemorating the 125th Anniversary of Korean America: **Current State, Future Directions**

Report on the Preliminary Findings from a National Survey of Korean Americans

Draft Release
October 2026



Commemorating the 125th Anniversary of Korean America: **Current State, Future Directions**

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Survey Recruitment and Data Collection

BSP Research

Funders

Korean American Institute

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This survey project was made possible through the generous funding and support of the Korean American Foundation (KAF) and the Korean American Institute (KAI). The researchers are especially grateful to KAF for its financial support and to KAI for its financial support, overall management, and advice throughout the various stages. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of KAF or KAI.

Federal regulations (45 CFR 46) require research involving human participants to be carried out under the oversight of an Institutional Review Board (IRB). This project, "Commemorating the 125th Anniversary of Korean America: Current State, Future Directions," has been reviewed and approved by the IRB at San Diego State University (IRB-25-0358).

If you have specific questions about the IRB or your rights as a research participant, please contact the San Diego State University Human Research Protection Program at (619) 594-6622 or email **IRB@sdsu.edu**. If you have questions about the survey itself, please email **KASurvey@ka.institute**.

Disclosure on the Use of Artificial Intelligence

During the preparation of this report, the authors made limited use of generative Artificial Intelligence (AI) platforms (including ChatGPT, Claude, CoPilot, Perplexity, and Scite) for editorial, formatting, and technical assistance. This includes refining language for clarity, checking grammar and citations, assisting with the formatting of tables and figures, and identifying potential gaps, inconsistencies, or additional sources for the authors' independent review. The research team used generative AI solely as a supplementary drafting, design, and research support tool, but they did not use it to generate original data, conduct empirical analysis, develop theoretical contributions, or determine the reports' substantive arguments or conclusions. Any AI-assisted text was carefully reviewed, substantively revised, and independently verified by the authors prior to inclusion. The authors used SPSS, R, and STATA to conduct quantitative analyses, and the core works cited and analyzed throughout the report derive from the authors' original research and scholarly judgment. All intellectual content, interpretations, and conclusions originate from the authors' own research and scholarly judgment. In addition, the authors made revisions in response to recommendations from external reviewers, who used generative AI tools to assist in developing and synthesizing their review comments. The authors retained full responsibility for all revisions, interpretations, analyses, and conclusions presented in the final report.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. The Korean American Institute's 2026 survey is the **first major national survey** of Korean Americans conducted by a nonprofit organization. It interviewed 1,466 adults in English or in Korean between February and April 2026. The findings below are those that hold across all generations[1] of survey respondents and across its margins of error; the chapters report many more comparisons, and readers should consult "How to Read the Numbers in This Report" before drawing conclusions from any single subgroup figure.
2. **Korean Americans identify first as Korean**. Asked which terms they use to describe themselves, respondents chose "Korean" (47%) and "Korean American" (42%) well ahead of "Asian American" or "American"; only 2% use "person of color." One in four reported being treated unfairly because of their Korean background in the past year, and six in ten agree that white privilege is a major problem in the United States today.
3. **Healthcare may be a common driving factor for some who are interested in "return migration" to Korea, especially among the earlier generations.** One in five Korean Americans seriously considered moving to Korea in the past year, and more than four in ten of them cited better health or healthcare as a reason. Interest in return migration declines with later generations.
4. **Mental health service use is low, relative to need.** Fewer than one in five women and one in eight men used any mental health service in the past year, despite 22–30% of Korean American respondents reporting mental health challenges. Use of mental health services is higher among the U.S.-born generation (19%) than among the immigrant population (13–15%).
5. **Korean Americans are reporting poor health conditions and disability in the past month.** While most respondents rate their overall physical and mental health as "(very) good," about one in four women and one in five men report their health "fair" or "(very) poor, which is higher than previous estimates for Korean Americans. The percentage reporting a disability or chronic health conditions (women: 19.5%, men: 12.2%) is also higher than previous estimates based on the Census Bureau's 2021 American Community Survey (ACS). Moreover, women experienced poorer health outcomes than men in this sample. They were almost twice as likely to rate their health as poor or very poor, and were substantially more likely to report a disability or chronic health condition.
6. **The U.S.-born generation of Korean Americans is more likely than the foreign-born population to feel economically worse off than other Americans.** Most respondents describe their current situation as comparable to or better than other Americans. However, second and later generation respondents are more likely than foreign born respondents to say they are worse off than other Americans (17% versus 9–13%), and that their childhood family was worse off (19% versus 8–11%), even though the share reporting feeling better off is stable across generations. Reported household income is highest among the first generation, which is partly attributed to the higher education of the first generation, particularly at the postgraduate level.
7. **Employment patterns are tied to gender roles, and generational changes are observed in entrepreneurship.** Women in the sample are more likely to be out of the labor force, which is tied to caregiving responsibilities, while men are more likely to work for a for-profit private company or business. More than two out of five respondents report ties with self or family businesses, but the type of involvement differs across generations. In particular, reports of a parent having started a business are significantly higher among the U.S.-born respondents.

8. **Intermarriage varies by generation and gender.** One quarter of married first-generation respondents have a non-Korean spouse, as compared with two-thirds of the U.S.-born second and later generations. Women are somewhat more likely than men to be intermarried: 42.6% of married women have a non-Korean or Korean-plus spouse, compared to 34.3% of married men. In addition, intermarriage rates increase with each generation, including with White, Other Asian, and Hispanic spouses, and secondarily, with Black spouses.
9. **Household labor remains gendered, less so in later generations.** Women are far more likely than men to be primarily responsible for daily chores and childcare, whereas men are more responsible for income earning, household finances, and home repair. The gender gap narrows among the 1.5 and disappears among the second and later generations. One in five respondents is also a regular caregiver for someone outside the household, with no difference by gender or generation.
10. **Korean American women favored Harris over Trump by a two to one margin; men were more evenly divided.** Among registered voters, 48% supported Harris, 34% Trump, and 18% expressed no preference. Excluding those without preference, the split was roughly 58–41, close to other national surveys of Korean American voters. The gender gap—a 25-point Harris margin among women against a statistical tie among men—is one of the largest differences observed in the survey.
11. **Among Korean Americans, higher education correlates with ideological divergence, rather than exclusive political liberalism.** Political moderates fall from 44% of high school graduates to 29% of advanced-degree holders, while highly-educated respondents divide almost evenly among liberals (34%) and conservatives (35%). This departs from the national pattern, in which higher education predicts more liberal views.
12. **Korean Americans are bilingual, but receive their news in English.** Nearly nine in ten Korean Americans speak English well or very well, and three in four say the same of the Korean language; yet more than half prefer to receive political news predominantly in English, and a majority of the 1.5 and second generations receive the news exclusively in English. Television and social media are the main sources of news, and social media leads as the source for the second generation.
13. **Protestantism is no longer a majority faith, and religious identity is more varied than earlier surveys suggest**. Protestants are a plurality (42%); Catholics (12%) and Buddhists (10%) follow. When given the option, one in ten respondents chose the label "spiritual but not religious," and the share with no religious affiliation (23%) is well below the 34% that the Pew Research Center reported in 2023—a difference that reflects, at least in part, the labels respondents were offered.
14. **Religious participation extends well beyond the religiously affiliated.** Nearly three in four respondents attended a religious gathering at least once in the past year, and three in ten attend twice a month or more. Even among those with no religious affiliation, 45% attended at least once. Four in ten attenders worship in predominantly Korean congregations and more than a third in racially mixed ones.

INTRODUCTION

In 2028, America will celebrate the 125th anniversary of the first Korean immigrants to the United States. Korean America's beginning included a smattering of students and laborers, due to immigration restrictions in the United States and political turmoil in their homeland. Over a half century later, the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (INA of 1965) precipitated a massive influx of immigrants from Asia, including Koreans.

Three decades after the INA of 1965, Korean Americans in the United States reached one million, which then doubled by 2022, making Korean Americans the largest diasporic population of Koreans outside their homeland. As of 2023, Korean Americans constitute the fifth largest Asian American group, representing 0.6% of the U.S. population and 9% of all Asian Americans—a population now marked by substantial generational, socioeconomic, and political diversity.

Simultaneously, the United States as a nation is undergoing a historic reckoning with heightened political divisions, while confronting the ills of racism in new demographic and social contexts. Anti-Asian hate crimes that surged during the pandemic resulting from the 2019 Coronavirus disease (COVID-19) have affected Korean Americans, which renewed the significance of social identity and political participation across ethnoracial divides.

Meanwhile, the popularity of Korean popular culture, the global power of Korean consumer brands, and their economic and technological prowess have presented Korean Americans with new possibilities. Korean Americans also have been elected into political positions in record numbers, and are becoming increasingly visible and vocal on the national scene.

Another important aspect of Korean Americans is their religious life. According to the Pew Research Center (2023), 59% of Korean Americans identify themselves as Christians with 46% identifying as Protestants.[2] Ethnic churches serve as the central hub of Korean immigrant communities, making them a key institution for social networking, mutual aid support, cultural preservation, and political mobilization.

In the shadow of these accomplishments, Korean Americans are dealing with myriad challenges both old and new, ranging from the widening of class disparities, the exclusion of multiracial Korean Americans and LGBTQ+ Korean Americans, the invisibility of Korean American adoptees and undocumented Korean Americans, and dwindling access to healthcare for senior citizens.

As more U.S.-born Korean Americans reach adulthood, new streams of Korean immigrants arrive on American shores with diverse backgrounds and worldviews, adding to the diversity of the community. Moreover, half the Korean American population now live outside established gateway cities where the majority were once concentrated, which transform the traditional understanding of the typical Korean American community formation process.

Amidst these changes, it remains an unfulfilled task to capture the ever-evolving landscape of Korean America, and to produce a comprehensive report on this diverse and dynamic population. This is the aim of this unprecedented national research project.

Korean Americans in the United States reached two million in 2022, making them the largest diasporic population of Koreans outside their homeland.

The Transformation of Korean America

Korean migration to the United States was spurred by demographic, political, and economic push and pull factors, as well as military, religious, missionary, and trade relations between the United States and South Korea that preceded and followed the Korean War.[3]

Despite the narrative of Korean American "success," the percentage of Korean Americans in poverty, 11%, is not that different from the national average of 13%.

Compared to the early migration of laborers and "picture brides" and the post-war migration of Korean adoptees and "war brides," the INA of 1965 changed the character of later generations of immigrants. This landmark law eliminated national quotas and prioritized skilled employment preferences and family reunification, which further diversified the composition of Koreans in America to educated, middle-class professionals and their families.

Today, Korean Americans have achieved one of the highest rates of entrepreneurship across all minority ethnic and racial groups in the United States, creating occupational niches in retail and manufacturing, grocery stores, restaurants, beauty and skincare, healthcare, technology and entertainment, and professional services.

Korean immigrants also assumed the labor-intensive role of selling corporate goods in predominantly African American or Latino neighborhoods in large numbers, but have faced backlash from local patrons and activists over allegations of overpriced goods, poor treatment of Black patrons, and lack of community contributions, such as hiring locally.

Korean America today is very different from Korean America in the 1980s when this community first captured the attention of scholars with growing ethnic enclaves and entrepreneurial niches like greengrocers, restaurants, liquor stores, and dry cleaners throughout Los Angeles and New York. In 1990, 44% of the Korean population lived in California, but now half of the Korean population in the United States are spread out across the country, including in Washington, Seattle, Atlanta, Dallas, and San Jose.

In 2019, 41% of the Korean population are U.S.-born,[4] which increased from 28% in 1990. Also, 57% of Korean Americans have a bachelor's degree or higher and 63% of U.S.-born Korean Americans have a college or postgraduate degree. Despite high levels of education and entry into professional employment, Korean Americans, like other Asian Americans, continue to face racial barriers and difficult paths to promotion for upper management.[5]

This partly explains why transnationally-linked ethnic enclave economies and Korean suburbs have expanded their economic reaches,[6] and second-generation Korean Americans have continued to invest in small business entrepreneurship like their parent generation.[7]

Despite the narrative of Korean American "success," the percentage of Korean Americans in poverty, 11%, is not that different from the national average of 13%.[8] Poverty largely impacts the Korean American elderly population who have among the highest senior poverty rates among Asian Americans.[9]

This report does not include a specific category for undocumented immigrants in its question about immigration status due to active immigration enforcement concerns during the time of the survey; however, researchers also cannot overlook the realities of undocumented Korean migrants and economic precarity and legal and social vulnerability they face in navigating life in the United States. In 2015, an estimated one out of seven Asians and one out of ten Koreans in the United States was estimated to be undocumented.[10] The implementation of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) revealed the reality of 1.5-generation Korean undocumented youths who face an uncertain future.[11]

An important shift to Korean America in the twenty-first century is the increased visibility of South Korea in the United States and the ways in which transnational flows have reshaped aspects of Korean America. The success of *Hallyu* (the "Korean Wave") in film, media, and music has penetrated American consumer and media culture; Korean multinational corporations (e.g., Hyundai, Samsung, and LG) have not only dominated over American brands, but also established manufacturing hubs nationwide and along the U.S.-Mexico border.[12]

The popularity of K-Pop and Korean dramas as well as its foods and beauty products broadened the consumer base for Korean restaurants and retails. Korean conglomerates have changed the demographics in certain American regions where they invested in infrastructure and jobs. Furthermore, the interest for Korea-related content in American college campuses has skyrocketed with the number of Korean language classes surging by 79% from 2009 to 2016.[13]

Health, Youth, and the Graying of Korean America

There is a critical need to study the overall physical and mental health and well-being of Korean Americans—both young and old—as the community experiences generational change and the extended lifespan and rapid graying of the population. In 2019, roughly 12% of the 2 million Korean Americans living in the United States were aged 65 and over.

The number of Korean American seniors continues to grow with the general immigration and aging of the population; delayed marriage and lower fertility rates also means fewer children to support them. For Korean Americans who are members of the "sandwich generation" juggling the care of both young children and their elderly parents, intergenerational and cultural differences between U.S.-born adult children and their immigrant parents can complicate their responsibilities.

Korean Americans also face specific health risks and chronic illnesses, such as smoking, alcohol consumption, hypertension, diabetes, tuberculosis, and liver disease, that require preventative care and disease intervention and management. Up-to-date scholarship on the mental health of AAPI is underdeveloped, but small-scale surveys and interview studies suggest that Koreans also tend to exhibit relatively equal or even higher rates of depression, suicide, and substance abuse as compared with their white and Asian American counterparts yet are least likely to utilize mental health services due to social stigma and the lack of culturally sensitive services.

Mental health conditions of Korean Americans have become worse after COVID-19 with a 52% jump in national suicide rates from 10.3 per 100,000 in 2011 to 15.7 in 2022, outpacing the national suicide rate.[14] COVID-19 has further aggravated these conditions by enhancing social isolation, fear and anxiety over health, intensifying caregiving duties, and triggering incidents of anti-Asian discrimination.

Considering these health needs, insufficient healthcare coverage and services was an area of significant concern for Korean Americans prior to the passage of the Affordable Care Act (ACA). In 2010, 26.6% of non-elderly Korean Americans did not have health insurance coverage, but after the ACA became law in 2010, uninsured rates declined significantly with only 7.8% that are uninsured.[15] In addition, Korean immigrants are heavily concentrated in small businesses that cannot cover rising healthcare premiums. Some outdated reports also suggest that only half of Korean Americans obtain annual exams from their primary doctors.

Political Directions after Sa-i-gu

The five-day civil unrest that started on April 29, 1992, ("sa-i-gu" in Korean for 4-2-9) in Los Angeles is widely known as a "wake-up call," "turning point," or "watershed event," in the Korean American community, which had a great impact on Korean American lives economically, psychologically, politically, and racially.[16]

With Korean immigrants viewing themselves as "foreign guests" in America, Sa-i-gu taught the Korean American community valuable lessons about political representation and community responsibilities, particularly how they

sought to claim their self-identity as well as the need to organize for equal rights through cross-racial coalitions. More importantly, it provided the future direction of Korean American politics.

First, older Korean communities witnessed the political coming-of-age of English-speaking 1.5 and second generation Korean American leaders, who were better positioned to articulate the grievances and needs of the Korean community to the media, social service agencies, and public officials during the post-Saigu period. Yet foreign-born immigrant elite still exerted enormous influence in the political affairs of Koreatown through their financial wealth, entrepreneurial visibility, and ethnic attachments to Koreatown.

Cycles of intergenerational cooperation and conflict continue around a wide range of issues, from views on gay marriage and labor conditions in small businesses to anti-Asian racism during the recent global pandemic; yet, community-based organizations have extended and diversified their services to other populations in the surrounding area. These efforts have included the organizing of traditionally-marginalized groups, such as intermarried Koreans, bi-/multi-racial Koreans, LGBTQ+ Koreans, and Korean adoptees.

Research on electoral patterns and political trends among Asian Americans—as the fastest growing group in the United States—can help inform policy priorities and facilitate greater democratic engagement and inclusion. The most recent 2020 data by AAPI Votes on political party affiliation among Korean Americans indicates that the majority of Korean Americans are affiliated with the Democratic Party (51%), while only 27% affiliate with the Republican Party and 21% as Independent or Other.[17]

Because of their relatively smaller population size and increasing geographic dispersion, institutions such as Korean churches and community-based organizations act as potent organizing forces for the larger ethnic population. At the same time, displays of ethnic and partisan solidarity obscure bitter internal divides, intra-ethnic hierarchies, and generational shifts in leadership that have required new strategies and alliances with other ethnic groups.

Objectives of this Survey

Despite existing scholarship on Korean Americans in the United States, there has not been a national comprehensive survey focusing on Korean Americans. A national survey could enhance the understanding of Korean Americans and provide insights for future directions, including:

1. Evaluating the current social and economic status of Korean Americans to capture the socio-economic challenges and tensions they face, including issues related to poverty, entrepreneurship, and professional advancement.
2. Examining the factors that influence Korean American's identity formation and civic and political activities to better understand their social and political integration within the broader context of American society and explore efforts to build coalitions across racial and ethnic lines.
3. Assessing the challenges related to health disparities and healthcare coverage, the shifting needs of the aging Korean American populations, and the distribution of household and caregiving responsibilities—all of which will help to develop effective support systems and interventions.

Methodology

The findings in this report come from a comprehensive survey funded by the Korean American Institute and the Korean American Foundation, designed by a team of Korean American academic researchers, and implemented by BSP Research, a company with significant expertise with minority communities.

Surveying the Korean American population poses a number of challenges, including the relatively small population size, diffused residential pattern, and emerging changes in surname. To address these challenges, the research team collected data as follows:

Participants were randomly selected from online panels maintained by experienced survey vendors with an established record of providing reliable and demographically accurate samples, and respondents enrolled in these panels were screened as Korean Americans and invited to complete the survey. The vendors targeted a diverse sample of Korean immigrants and Korean Americans ages 18 and above across the United States.

Between February 10 and April 1, 2026. surveys were collected from a total of 1,503 Korean American respondents through online and live-telephone interviews. Online survey invitations were sent to participants by text message, email, and through online panel notifications. Respondents could complete the survey through live telephone interviews, through an app on their smartphone or on a tablet or computer. All surveys online and by phone were available in English and in Korean.

In total, 64% of respondents completed the survey online, and 36% completed the survey by live telephone interview. The overall response rate was 28%. The live phone interview portion had a response rate of 26%, and the online component had a response rate of 30%.

The survey instrument, along with recruitment materials and protocols used to contact the respondents were reviewed and approved by IRB. In addition to basic demographic information, the survey questionnaire covers five major topic areas: (1) health and well-being, (2) identity and relationships, (3) gender and family life, (4) work and household finance, and (5) community involvement and political views.

A post-stratification raking algorithm was used to apply weights to balance the sample to the best-known estimates for Korean Americans based on age, gender, education, state, nativity, and religion, using the 2024 5-year ACS average, and the 2024 Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey (CMPS).

Following the conventional approaches (e.g., in order to align with categories used by the Pew Research Center survey), the research team defined Korean Americans as anyone who self-identifies their ethnicity as Korean American, regardless of their parentage and adoption status. This broader definition includes respondents who identify as multiracial, those who were adopted, and those who may have distant biological ties to Korean ethnicity other than immediate parents.

Most survey participants identified themselves as Korean, and complied with the survey's definition of Korean American. This reduces the sample from the original 1,503 to 1,466. However, by definition, those who do not identify as Korean, even if they have Korean parentage (n=37), were excluded in most of the analyses in this report. The report provides some insights on this subsample in the section below on identity, discrimination, and belonging.

This report presents the preliminary results from the data analysis using statistical methods that will be largely accessible to general readership (e.g., frequency, cross-tabulation, and analysis of variance tests). The research team is continuing to conduct more advanced statistical analyses that focus in depth on specific topics, with the goal of reporting the study findings to both academic and public audiences through conference presentations, publications, and media coverage.

HOW TO READ THE NUMBERS IN THIS REPORT

Every percentage in this report is an estimate from a sample of 1,466 Korean American adults, weighted to match the national Korean American population on age, gender, education, state, nativity, and religion, using the aforementioned post-stratification raking algorithm. The margin of error for the survey is +/-2.48 percentage points at 95% confidence level, which is the standard convention across polling and survey research.[18]

While the sample size of this survey provides sufficient statistical power, disaggregating the results into groups with small cells (e.g., second generation by gender) increases the margins of error.

Wherever appropriate, this report indicates in the text, table, or figure whether the presented result is statistically significant.

For example, in comparing women's and men's responses, the report notes that, in the weighted sample, women are older than men (mean age 51.5 versus 42.3) and more likely to be first- or 1.5-generation immigrants (76.5% versus 67.4%). Weighting corrects the *overall* age and gender distributions separately to match the population, but not their combination. Some gender differences in this report may therefore partly be the result of age and generation differences. If the authors checked on whether a reported gender difference within age groups are statistically significant, this is noted in the text and the appropriate table or figure.

Demographic Portrait of Koreans in the United States

Table 1 shows the descriptive characteristics of these respondents to align the sample with the demographic characteristics of known population benchmarks.[19] Approximately two thirds of respondents completed the survey in English (65.3%) and one third in Korean (34.7%).

In the weighted sample, respondents are relatively well-balanced across all adult age groups with 24% age 60 and above. Women (53.3%) slightly outnumber men (46.4%) with roughly 0.3% reporting other gender identities and the dominant majority identifying as heterosexual/straight (94.7%).

This report categorizes Korean Americans according to where they were educated—a benchmark that reflects the context in which they were socialized and where they established their formative peer relationships. Using this criteria, "first generation" are defined as those who arrived in the United States after they turned 17, and second generation or later generation are those who were born in the United States.

This report also separately classified those who immigrated before the age of 18 as "1.5 generation," a category that has been particularly impactful in Korean American scholarship because of their bicultural identity and socialization,[20] as well as their role as a bridge between the insular immigrant community and the larger mainstream American society.[21]

Korean Americans are geographically diverse with the largest percentage of respondents living in the West (41.1%), followed by the South (24.6%), Northeast (22.8*), and Midwest (11.6%). The majority of Korean Americans are immigrants, with 34.6% having arrived after the age of 17 and 37.6% who arrived before age 18, and only 27.85 were born in the United States. However, birthplace does not fully capture the strength of respondents' ties to the United States: 53.1% reported being raised in the United States and 43% are naturalized U.S. citizens.

Korean Americans are also relatively highly educated, including 60.5% who hold a bachelor's degree or higher, and 20.5% having a high school degree or less.

Table 1. Descriptive Characteristics of Respondents (N=1,466)	
CHARACTERISTIC	**PERCENTAGE**
INTERVIEW LANGUAGE	
Korean	34.7
English	65.3
AGE	
18–29	19.4
30–39	19.4
40–49	20.6
50–59	16.5
60+	24.2
GENDER	
Women	53.3
Men	46.4
Other gender identities	0.3
SEXUAL ORIENTATION	
Heterosexual/Straight	94.7
LGBTQ+	4.0
Prefer not to disclose	1.3
MARITAL STATUS	
Married or in domestic partnership	59.3
Never married	32.8
Separated, divorced, or widowed	7.9
HOUSEHOLD SIZE	
Mean household size	3.0
EDUCATION	
High School or Less	20.5
Some College/Associate Degree	18.9
Bachelor's Degree	44.4
Graduate Degree	16.1

REGION [22]	
West	41.1
Midwest	11.6
Northeast	22.8
South	24.6
PLACE OF BIRTH [23]	
South Korea	70.5
United States	27.8
Other	1.8
PLACE RAISED	
South Korea	45.9
United States	53.1
Other	1.0
GENERATION	
First generation immigrant arrived after age 17	34.6
1.5 generation immigrant arrived before age 18	37.6
Second or later generation born in the U.S.	27.8
IMMIGRATION STATUS	
U.S.-born Citizen	27.8
Naturalized Citizen	43.0
Permanent Resident	21.4
Visa Holder	6.8
Other/Prefer Not to Say[24]	1.0
ANNUAL HOUSEHOLD INCOME [25]	
Q1 (0–$50,000)	21.9
Q2 ($50,001–$100,000)	25.1
Q3 ($100,001–$150,000)	21.0
Q4 ($150,001–$200,000)	14.7
Q5 ($200,001+)	17.3

Note: Percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding

IDENTITY, DISCRIMINATION, AND BELONGING

This section of the report analyzes the survey responses that relate to the respondent's sense of identity, discrimination, and belonging in Korean America. This report defines Korean Americans as anyone who self-identifies as Korean, regardless of parentage or adoptions status.

This broader category includes respondents who identify as multiracial, those who were adopted, and anyone with distant biological ties to Korean ethnicity other than immediate parents. This report excluded those who do not identify as Korean, even if they have Korean parentage, with some insights on this subsample below. N=32 (2% of the sample).

Racial and Ethnic Identity and Heritage




Figure 1. Racial Identity (N=1,466)

Survey respondents predominantly identified as Asian (90.2%), making this the dominant racial group that Korean Americans identified with the most. Mixed race was the next highest at 5.8%. Latine was the third highest at 2.9%. The smallest racial categories that respondents identified with were White (0.6%), NHPI (0.3%), Black (0.1%), and Other (0.1%).

Race is a social construct that identifies and categorizes people based on physical traits like hair and skin color. "Asian American" is an umbrella category that encompasses multiple ethnic groups with distinct languages, cultures, and histories, but has been invoked since the 1960s to signify common experiences as a racialized minority, similar immigrant family histories, and/ or a basis for political solidarity.

When cross tabulating with age, the report found the following (Note: Percentages may not sum to 100% due to rounding. Categories with very small sample sizes may round to 0.0%).

Table 2. Racial Identity by Age (N=1,466)							
Age	**Asian**	**White**	**Black**	**Latine**	**NHPI**	**Mixed Race**	**Other**
18–29	81.3	2.3	0.3	5.7	0.5	9.9	0
30–39	90.6	0	0	3	0	6.1	0.3
40–49	89.6	0.5	0	3	0.8	6.1	0
50–59	94.9	0.6	0	1.4	0	3	0
60+	94.3	0	0	1.3	0.3	3.7	0.3

Table 3. Racial Identity by Region (N=1,466)							
Region	**Asian**	**White**	**Black**	**Latine**	**NHPI**	**Mixed Race**	**Other**
Midwest	87.9	1.2	0	6.6	0.5	3.8	0
Northeast	90.4	0.5	0	1.8	0.3	6.8	0.2
South	85.8	0.6	0.2	4.6	0.2	8.2	0.3
West	93.4	0.7	0	1.3	0.4	4.3	0

Table 4. Racial Identity by generation (N=1,466)							
Generation	**Asian**	**White**	**Black**	**Latine**	**NHPI**	**Mixed Race**	**Other**
Immigrant arrived after age 17	96	0	0	3.1	0.2	0.5	0.2
Immigrant arrived before age 18, or 1.5 generation	91.3	0.3	0	3.6	0.2	4.7	0
Born in the U.S., or second and later generation	81.4	2	0.2	1.6	0.8	13.8	0.2

Based on the cross tabulations of the data with age, gender, region, and generation, the findings show that the first generation of respondents highly identified as being Asian (96%), and the second and later generations identified the least with Asian. This may be the result of increasing acculturation among respondents with two Korean parents, or the rise in respondents with parents of mixed races among the second and later generations.




Figure 2. Parental Heritage (N=1,466)

The predominant majority of respondents (71.3%) reported that both of their parents were of Korean ancestry. Respondents identifying with only one parent of Korean ancestry (23.5%) show that Korean America is becoming more mixed race and mixed ethnicity. Respondents indicated that they were also adopted with at least one biological Korean parent (3.9%), had no Korean ancestry (0.7%), or the question was not applicable (0.6%).

Respondents identifying with only one parent of Korean ancestry (23.5%) show that Korean America is becoming more mixed race and mixed ethnicity.

By age, ages 18–29 (66.5%) had the lowest two parents of Korean ancestry response, followed by 50–59 (70.8%), 40–49 (71.4%), 60+ (73%), and 30–39 (74.2%). For those adopted with at least one biological Korean parent the percentage was highest with 40–49-year-olds (5.6%) and 18–29 year olds (4.5%). Those with one parent of Korean ancestry, the numbers were pretty similar with 18–29 year olds having the highest percentage at 28.1%.

Overall, this data needs to be further analyzed. For example, during and immediately after the Korean War, the number of Korean children who were adopted by American families were significant. Today, such adoptions are regulated by the South Korean government which has reduced the numbers.




Figure 3. Ethnic Identity (N=1,466)

In terms of ethnic identity, survey respondents identified highest with the terms Korean (46.5%), and Korean American (41.7%). They identified the lowest with a Person of Color (2.2%), and American (18.5%). Note that respondents could select several categories so the graph denotes the widest range of possible identities.

Clearly, the respondents identified most strongly with ethnic identity, above all other categories; Korean and Korean American show the highest percentage at 46.5% and 41.7%, respectively.

There are several possibilities for the disconnect between Korean parental ancestry and non-identification as Koreans: someone might be biologically Korean, but possibly intermarried with someone who is a non-Korean Asian, and now that person identifies as both Korean and another ethnicity. Also, someone may have Korean parents but a non-Korean grandparent. The respondent may also be mixed Korean but does not identify as Korean.

Views on Belonging and Discrimination




Figure 4. Discrimination Due to Korean Heritage (N=1,466)

This question did not specifically use the term racism or discrimination, but instead focused on Korean ancestry as the marker for being treated unfairly. Survey respondents indicated that they were not treated unfairly at work, school, or out in public very often because of their Korean heritage (44.9%), while others indicated that such occurrence was rare (30.5%). Overall, respondents indicated that they were treated unfairly sometimes, often, and very often for a combined 24.6% total.

The cross tabulated views on unequal treatment with age, gender, generation, and region produced interesting results. When combining sometimes, often, and very often, all age groups came in the range of 20.3%–24.2%. By gender, women had the most sometimes, often, and very often responses with 26.8% and men at 23% (no statistically significant difference at $p < 0.05$). By generation, the first generation had the highest percentage of the combined sometimes, often, and very often response with 29.4% (statistically significant at $p < 0.05$).

Respondents somewhat agreed (42.8%) that racial and ethnic minorities can succeed in the United States if they work hard. Those that agreed strongly (31.4%) were much higher than those that somewhat disagreed and strongly disagreed (combined at 8.4%). Interestingly, those that neither agreed or disagreed (17.4%) was higher than those that disagreed or strongly disagreed. Overall, Korean Americans believe that racial and ethnic minorities can succeed through hard work.

Cross tabulating with age, all age categories somewhat agreed or strongly agreed (combined responses) with this question. The 60+ age group had the highest agreement with the combined categories at 83.7% and the lowest was the 18–29 age group with 68.7%. Younger respondents are significantly less likely than older ones to agree, though two thirds still agree with the claim.

By gender, men and women both somewhat and strongly agreed with the statement at 75.8% and 74% respectively. By region those living in the West had the highest somewhat agree and strongly agree responses at 79.4%. Other region responses: the Midwest (72.7%), the Northeast (70.9%), the South (71.6%).

Overall, Korean Americans still believe in the idea of meritocracy, or working hard to succeed. However, the data does show that the younger generation is beginning to shift away from this perspective as 11.5% of the 18–29 year old respondents either somewhat disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement.

Respondents somewhat agreed (44.4%) that Korean Americans are harder workers than most other racial groups in the United States. Only 17.9% strongly agreed, with 27.8% neither agreeing or disagreeing, and 9.9% somewhat disagreeing or strongly disagreeing.

When cross tabulating for age, gender, generation, and region, neither response was 21%-33.7%. However, the somewhat agree and strongly agree responses still had the majority ranging from 50.4%–78.3%.

Overall, 60.8% of Korean Americans view white privilege as a problem in the United States today. Respondents somewhat agreed (39.3%) that white privilege is a major problem, with 21.5% strongly agreeing with the statement. Also, 23.8% of respondents neither agreed or disagreed with the statement. About 15.5% of respondents somewhat disagreed and strongly disagreed with the statement.

When cross tabulating, all categories showed more than 50% somewhat agree and strongly agree responses across all age groups, regions, gender, and generations. Differences by age (from 56% among those 18–29 to 62% among those 50–59) and by region (from 58% to 66%) are within sampling error.




Figure 5. Meritocracy and White Privilege Opinions (N=1,466)

While most respondents in this survey rated their overall physical and mental health as "(very) good," about one in four women and one in five men report their health "fair" or "(very) poor. In addition, a closer look at the data uncovers a number of notable disparities in the source, stability and quality of health and healthcare coverage.

Considering that data on Korean American health conditions are limited and often outdated, this survey result provides valuable insights on the overall health and well-being of Korean Americans.

Health Conditions

Combining "very good" and "good" ratings, 74.2% of women and 77.7% of men rated their physical health positively in the past month. On the other hand, 25.7% of women and 22.4% of men rate their physical health fair or (very) poor. These figures are higher than the 12% previously estimates for Korean Americans from the 2010–2014 National Health Interview Survey (NHIS),[26] although the NHIS asks about health in general, rather than health in the past month.

The percentage reporting a disability or chronic health conditions (women: 19.5%, men: 12.2%) is also higher than previous estimates based on the 2021 ACS (7.5% for men and women combined).[27]

At the same time, women were nearly twice as likely as men to rate their physical health as poor or very poor (5.8% vs. 3.1% percent). Moreover, women reported a higher rate of disability or chronic health conditions than men (19.5% vs. 12.2%). These gender differences in self-reported health may be partially related to differences in insurance sources and mental health service usage, as described below.




Figure 6. Physical Health in the Past Month by Gender (N=1,461)

Note: The percentage for "very poor" is very small, so it has been combined with "poor."

Self-rated mental health and emotional well-being in the past month in general show a similar pattern to physical health, with a larger gender gap in reporting "very poor" health (8.1% for women vs. 3.6% men) than in physical health.




Figure 7. Mental Health in the Past Month by Gender (N=1,461)

Note: The percentage for "very poor" is very small, so it has been combined with "poor."

Health Insurance and Healthcare

Health insurance coverage among Korean American respondents was most commonly obtained through an employer, but the pathway to coverage differed by gender. Men were more likely than women to be covered through their own current or former employer (43.9 percent vs. 35.6 percent) and through insurance purchased directly by themselves (18.5 percent vs. 15.7 percent).

Women, by contrast, were nearly twice as likely as men to rely on Medicare, Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI), or other public insurance for those 65 and older or with a qualifying disability (17.4 percent vs. 9.4 percent).

This pattern is consistent with the higher rate of self-reported disability among women documented above and with women's older average age in the sample. Women are also more likely than men to have MediCal/Medicaid or other public insurance with limited income (17.5% vs. 11.7%).

In the United States, Asian Americans have the lowest uninsured rate of any major racial or ethnic group, at 5.7 percent,[28] but the Korean American respondents in this sample report a modestly higher uninsured rate of 7.9–8.0 percent across genders.




Figure 8. Health Insurance Coverage by Gender (N=1,461)

Note: Multiple answers were allowed; therefore, the percentages may sum to more than 100%.

For those who were self-employed or worked in a paid or unpaid family business (N=234), reliance on direct-purchase insurance is higher, particularly for men—31.1 percent of self-employed men and 23.3 percent of self-employed women purchased insurance directly, well above the rate seen in the full sample.

Women in this subgroup were also more than twice as likely as men to rely on Medicare/SSDI or other public insurance (22.1 percent vs. 10.5 percent), continuing the gendered pattern observed in the full sample. This pattern toward direct-purchase and public coverage among the self-employed is consistent with national research showing that self-employed workers are less likely than those employed by private firms or governments to have employer-sponsored insurance, relying instead more heavily on direct-purchase and public coverage.[29]

Rates of being uninsured were similar to the full sample for women (8.0 percent) and modestly higher for men (8.6 percent vs. 7.9 percent in the full sample), suggesting that self-employment changes the source of coverage in this Korean American sample more than it changes the overall risk of having no coverage at all.

Unlike South Korea's universal national healthcare system, American healthcare is heavily privatized with access often tied to full-time employment or military service. The major disparities in the access and affordability of healthcare can be strong motivating factors for "return migration" among older immigrants, especially when returning to their home country offers more affordable care or stronger family support.[30] However, the effects depend on the severity of illness, accessibility of care in the host country, their legal status, financial resources, and the proximity of close family.[31]

Nearly half of respondents who had considered moving to Korea cited better health or healthcare as a reason, with interest declining steadily across immigrant generations. Among respondents who reported seriously thinking about moving to Korea in the last 12 months (N=318), better health and/or healthcare was a commonly cited reason—44.2 percent of women and 41.8 percent of men who considered moving named this as a reason—with no substantial gender gap.

Women in the sample were considerably more likely than men to report having received mental health services in the past 12 months, 18.2 percent of women, compared to 12.2 percent of men. This is consistent with evidence that Asian Americans are less likely than White Americans to access mental health treatment, despite similar or greater perceived need.[32] The rate of mental health service use is also lower than that of mental health challenges documented for Korean Americans (ranging from 22% to 30% depending on symptoms and frequency), also suggesting the potential unmet care needs of mental health care.[33]

Mental health service use varied by immigrant generation. It was similar among the first generation (15.4 percent) and the 1.5 generation (13.1 percent)—a difference within sampling error—and higher among the U.S.-born second-plus generation (19.0 percent). The higher rate among the U.S.-raised second and later generations is broadly consistent with generational patterns of increased mental health help-seeking documented for the overall U.S. population.[34]

Hardship Associated with Medical Bills and Healthcare

Major medical debt was relatively uncommon in the sample. Among respondents, 7.2 percent of women and 5.0 percent of men reported having major debt from medical bills in the past 12 months, which is a difference within sampling error. Rates were also similar across immigrant generations (6.0 percent, 6.4 percent, and 6.0 percent among the first, 1.5, and second-plus generations respectively). This result suggests that major medical debt does not vary significantly by gender or generation.

At the national level, Asian Americans report medical debt at notably lower rates than other racial and ethnic groups—3 percent of Asian Americans report having medical debt, compared to 7 percent of white Americans and 13 percent of Black Americans.[35] However, the percentage reporting medical debt in this survey results is lower than that documented in the 2016 National Asian American Survey, because the survey question wording is different between the two surveys.

This survey asked whether, in the past 12 months, a respondent experienced any *major debt* from medical bills, while the National Asian American Survey asks about *everyday hardships due to medical debt* (32%). These findings imply that Korean Americans experience hardship as a result of medical debt and health care costs on a daily basis, although it may not necessarily lead to major debt.

A larger share of respondents reported delaying healthcare due to cost—9.2 percent of women and 7.7 percent of men said they or their family had put off receiving healthcare because they could not afford it in the past 12 months. This measure rises across generations from 6.4 percent among the first generation to 9.1 percent among the 1.5 generation and 10.3 percent among the second-plus generation, though only the first-to-second generation contrast approaches statistical significance.

This pattern may reflect rising healthcare costs and reduced family-based cost-sharing as later generations become more independent of first-generation households. National data shows that 8 percent of Asian American adults report going without a doctor visit due to cost.[36] This survey findings indicate that cost-related barriers to care affect Korean Americans at rates similar to or slightly higher than those among Asian Americans nationally, even as their debt burden appears comparatively lower.

Educational Attainment

Overall educational attainment for both Korean American men and women is high. Among the respondents, 61.3% of women and 59.9% of men[37] have earned at least a bachelor's degree or higher. This is broadly in line with the 60% that Pew Research reports for Korean Americans nationally.[38]

Some gender differences are found among lower levels of education. Compared to men, a higher percentage of women have a high school education or less (22.8% vs. 17.9%), and a lower percentage have some college or an associate degree (15.9% vs. 22.1%). However, there is little gender difference at the bachelor's or post-graduate degree levels.




Figure 9. Educational Level by Gender (N=1,461)

English Usage and Proficiency




Figure 10. Level of English Proficiency by Generation (N=1,466)

Note: Generational differences are shown in comparison to first generation; the "Not too well" category includes "Not at all."

English usage and proficiency are important indicators of immigrant integration and mobility.[39] The proportion of survey respondents who speak English every day is higher among the younger generations (69.5% among the first generation, 89.0% among the 1.5 generation, and 96.8% among the U.S.-born respondents). This pattern likely reflects the younger age profile of 1.5 and second and later generations—many of whom grew up in English-language schooling and home environments, even while living in households with Korean immigrant parents.[40]

Self-rated proficiency in the survey question follows the same pattern, with 34.6% of first generation respondents describing themselves as speaking English "very well," compared with 67.0% of the 1.5 generation, and 82.2% of the second and later generation.

Employment Status and Entrepreneurship




Figure 11. Employment Status by Gender (N=1,461)

Note: Multiple responses are allowed (e.g., working at two jobs), and the total sum presented in the figure may be over 100%; generational differences are shown in comparison to the first generation.

Consistent with the household-role patterns described in the Gender and Family section, women in the sample were more likely than men to report not currently being employed (25.7% vs. 13.6%), while men were more likely to work for a for-profit private company or business (54.4% vs. 39.6%).

Women's non-employment is disproportionately tied to caregiving—20.1% report taking care of family (children or elderly parents), compared with only 5.6% of men.

However, compared to the estimates in the ACS data from 2020 to 2022,[41] the first generation women in this survey sample show higher employment rates, even after accounting for differences in measurement and sample composition.[42] This finding suggests that Korean immigrant women's labor force participation may have increased in recent years, although further analysis using the newly added national-level data is needed to confirm this pattern.

Rates of self-employment are more similar by gender (13.1% women, 11.7% men). Among those not currently employed (n=252), the reasons differ sharply by gender. Women's non-employment is disproportionately tied to

caregiving—20.1% report taking care of family (children or elderly parents), compared with only 5.6% of men. Men's non-employment is more often linked to life difficulties and circumstances, both individual (e.g., being a student, a physical or mental health condition) and structural (e.g., being terminated from a job, being unable to find a job they want).

The measure of entrepreneurship combines data on business ownership and self-employment with family business workers. The survey included the latter because studies have found that women and children often work in or jointly manage family businesses that are held in their husbands' names—an omission which would not be captured in employment measures based solely on ownership.[43]

In terms of occupation, nearly half of the Korean Americans surveyed were employed in the private sector (46.4%), but a significant percentage (12.5%) reported that they are also self-employed or business owners. About 46.8% of those affiliated with businesses claimed to be single proprietors, but a significant number (34.6%) are also involved in family businesses with spouses/partners, families, or siblings—a figure that affirms the importance of family-run businesses for Korean Americans.




Figure 12. Ties with Family Business by Generation (N=1,466)

Note: Multiple responses are allowed; therefore, the total sum presented in the figure may be over 100%; generational differences are shown in comparison to first generation.

Prior research describes Korean immigrant entrepreneurship as a first generation adaptation to labor market constraints, with mixed evidence on whether it serves as a springboard, a safety net, or a mobility trap for the second generation.[44]

More than two out of five (43.3%) respondents in this survey indicated their ties with self or family businesses, but the type of involvement differs across generations. The 1.5 generation reports rates of entrepreneurship for themselves (20.7%) similar to or slightly above the first generation (16.6%)—a difference within sampling error. In contrast, the percentage of second and later generation respondents who started business is lower (12.2%) than that of 1.5- (20.7%) and first-generation (16.6%). The difference between the first and second-plus generation is marginally significant, but the difference between the first and 1.5 generation is not significant.

Interestingly, reports of a parent having started a business are markedly higher with each generation—from 4.3% among the first generation to 12.9% among the 1.5 generation and 24.0% among the U.S.-born respondents. The data confirms Min and Kim's finding that second generation Asian Americans (including Koreans) are less likely to be self-employed than are first generation Asian Americans.[45]

They show that education has a negative effect on their likelihood of self-employment with results suggesting that U.S.-born children are less likely to seek self-employment as they face fewer cultural and linguistic barriers and occupational discrimination than their immigrant counterparts.

Still, the results of this survey also finds that 1.5 generation Korean Americans appear to be pursuing entrepreneurship at a comparable rate to the first generation. Further analysis would be required to determine if this is because the second generation U.S.-born sample are generally younger and not yet of age to establish a business.

Household Income

Reported household income is highest among the first generation but declines across generations. For example, the share of households earning over $200,000 falls from 22.1% among the first generation to 14.5% among the 1.5 generation and 10.2% among the second and later generations.

Similar patterns are found for the next highest income bracket ($150,000–$200,000), with the significant difference between first and the 1.5 and second or later generations. However, the percentage of $100,000 to $150,000 is comparable for the first generation and U.S.-born generations.

Household income tends to increase with career advancement and age, and the first generation in this sample is older (mean age of 52.5 years) than the 1.5 generation (47.8 years) and second and later generations (39.6 years). A more detailed examination, however, shows that household income differences across generations cannot be attributed to age differences. In addition, the first generation's higher share in the high-income group (over $150,000) partly reflects the higher educational attainment of this group, particularly at the postgraduate level.

It is worth noting that a generational gap in high household income remains even after accounting for both age and education. This pattern is somewhat different from other national data sources, such as Pew Research and the Migration Policy Institute report, where U.S.-born Korean American households and Korean immigrant households overall show smaller or reverse patterns in these generational gaps.[46]

It should be noted that the data collection methodology and sample differ. For example, Pew Research Center's estimates include self-identified Korean (which is similar to this survey's approach) or in combination with other races, ethnicities, or Asian origins, and do not differentiate postgraduate degree attainment by generation.[47]




Figure 13. Household Income by Generation (N=1,466)

Note: Generational differences are shown in comparison to first generation.

Married respondents report the highest incomes—a trend which may reflect the greater combined earnings of

dual-earner households among married couples. Specifically, 19.4% of married respondents' households earn over $200,000, compared with 12.4% of single respondents, 9.6% of cohabiting respondents, and 9.5% of divorced/separated/widowed respondents.

Those in marital union are also less likely than singles to be in the lowest income bracket, while there is no significant difference between divorced/widowed, cohabiting, and single respondents. These findings are consistent with evidence that married people tend to be in better financial circumstances than unmarried people.[48]

Subjective Assessment of Socioeconomic Status




Figure 14. Perceived Socioeconomic Status Relative to Other Americans (N=1,466)

Note: The result is based on the question asking, "Thinking about your current situation, in terms of having money, education, and a good job, how do you think you compare to other Americans?"; Generational differences are shown in comparison to first generation.

The survey asked Korean Americans about the perceptions of their socioeconomic status compared to other Americans, as well as their childhood family circumstances. Most respondents described their current situation as comparable to or better than other Americans—46% report being "about the same," and 41.5% report being somewhat or much better off.

When comparing generations, however, second and later generation respondents were both more likely to report being somewhat worse off than first generation respondents (13.2% vs. 8.0%) and much worse off (4.1% vs. 0.5%). This suggests a dispersal in perceived socioeconomic standing, with less favorable self-perceived status relative to other Americans among the U.S.-born generation than among immigrants, both first and 1.5 generation.

GENDER AND FAMILY

This section describes the demographic, marital, family, and household characteristics of Korean American respondents, with attention to how these patterns vary by gender and by immigrant generation.

Gender Identity and Sexual Orientation

Almost all respondents report their gender as man or woman (99.7%), and a very small percentage (0.3%) identify as transgender or gender non-binary/non-conforming. In terms of sexual orientation, the large majority of respondents (94.7%) identify as heterosexual or straight; 4.0% identify as gay, lesbian, bisexual, or another LGBQ+ identity, and 1.3% prefer not to disclose their sexual orientation.

LGBTQ+ identification is higher with each generation, from 2.5% among first-generation respondents, to 3.9% among the 1.5 generation, to 5.8% among the U.S.-born second and later generation. The difference between the foreign-born and U.S.-born generations is significant. The higher rate of LGBTQ+ identification among younger generations is consistent with national trends.[49]

Marital Status

As the figure shows, women and men are married at similar rates (56.0% of women, 54.8% of men), but women are less likely than men to have never married (29.2% vs. 36.4%) and correspondingly more likely to be currently divorced, separated, or widowed (9.9% vs. 5.7%) or cohabiting/partnered without being married (5.0% vs. 3.1%).

This difference may reflect women's older average age in the survey data and is also consistent with the gender gap in marital dissolution and remarriage in the general U.S. population.[50] This 55–56% married rate is close to the 58% of Korean adults nationally that Pew Research reports as married.[51]




Figure 15. Marital Status by Gender (N=1,461)

Note: The unmarried category includes divorced, separated, and widowed. The cohabiting category includes domestic partnerships and living with a partner without being legally married.

Family Structure

The average household size for Korean Americans in the survey is three, which is slightly higher than that of the average American household (2.53), according to the 2020–2024 ACS 5-year estimates.[52]

About three in five respondents (58.9%) have at least one child, including both minor (age <=18) and adult (age over 18). Among respondents with children (N=825), the large majority (87.2%) have at least one biological child from their current relationship, but a meaningful minority report more complex family structures: roughly one in nine parents (10.9%) have at least one biological child from a previous relationship, roughly one in twenty (4.98%) have at least one stepchild, and smaller shares report adopted children (1.2%) or children in another family arrangement (2.0%).

Pew Research Center reports that Asian American children have the lowest rate of living in a blended family (with a stepparent, stepsibling, or half-sibling) of any major U.S. racial or ethnic group, which is about 7%, compared to roughly 15–17% among White, Black, and Hispanic children.[53] The pattern is attributed to Asian Americans' comparatively high share of first-marriage, two-parent households.[54] The findings in this survey are broadly consistent with that of the national pattern, while showing a meaningful but still minority representation of blended Korean American families.

In addition, the presence of young children in the household varies by marital status. The vast majority of never-married (93.8%) respondents have no children under 18 at home, and married respondents are markedly more likely to have young children in the household—28.9% have one child, 14.3% have two, and 6.7% have three or more. The presence of children for married people in the survey data (50%) is comparable to that of the most recent ACS.[55]

It is also worth noting that more than one in four cohabiting respondents (26.7%) raise children at home. While it is lower than the national average (36.2% for heterosexual couples) estimated from the 2021 ACS, this survey's finding suggests that cohabitation is also an important union context in which Korean American children grow up.[56]




Figure 16. Interracial Marriage by Gender and Generation (N=870)

*Note: *Generational differences are shown in comparison to first generation.*

Among currently married or partnered respondents, 61.2% have a spouse or partner who is Korean only, 36.1% have a non-Korean spouse or partner, and 2.7% have a spouse or partner who is Korean plus another race/ethnicity—an overall intermarriage rate of 38.8%. Women are somewhat more likely than men to be intermarried, with 42.6% of married women having a non-Korean or Korean-plus spouse, compared to 34.3% of married men .

The much larger driver of intermarriage, however, is the immigrant generation. Only 24.6% of married first-generation respondents have a non-Korean or Korean-plus spouse, compared to 46.1% of the 1.5 generation and 66.2% of the U.S.-born second and later generation; both differences from the first generation are statistically significant.

Only 24.6% of married first-generation respondents have a non-Korean or Korean-plus spouse, compared to 46.1% of the 1.5 generation and 66.2% of the U.S.-born second and later generation; both differences from the first generation are statistically significant.

This steep generational increase aligns with the pattern that Pew Research has documented for intermarriage among Asian Americans nationally, where U.S.-born and later-generation individuals intermarry at substantially higher rates than immigrants.[57]




Figure 17. Spouse's Race by Generation (N=870)

Note: Multiple responses are allowed for respondents with multiracial spouses. Some groups (e.g., Native Americans) are not shown due to very small percentages; Generational differences are shown in comparison to the first generation.

A detailed examination of spouse's race and ethnicity shows declining percentages of marrying Koreans among both 1.5 and second-and-later generations. The survey respondents' 1.5 and second-and-later generations also show higher interracial marriage rates with Other Asian, White, and Hispanic spouses.

The second and later generation also show an increase in intermarriage with Black spouses compared to the first generation, though the percentage remains lower than for Korean, Other Asian, and Hispanic spouses.

Care and Household Roles

The survey asked who is responsible for various household roles, such as household chores, household finances, and home repair/maintenance. Response options include "primarily responsible," "share the task equally," "handled by someone else," "hired out," or "not applicable." The results indicate that women are substantially more likely than men to be primarily responsible for day-to-day chores (57.2% vs. 43.9%) and childcare (46.1% vs. 28.7%).

For the remaining roles, however, the pattern runs in the opposite direction. Men are more likely than women to be primarily responsible for income earning (56.7% vs. 35.3%), household finances (55.5% vs. 40.0%), and especially home repair and maintenance (56.9% vs. 24.3%).




Figure 18. Household Division of Labor by Gender (N=1,436)

Note: The number of respondents ranges from 631 (eldercare) to 1,436 (household chores); Multiple responses were allowed.

These stark gender differences in the division of labor are consistent with earlier studies documenting the traditional, patriarchal values found among Korean American families, often associated with economic segregation in ethnic enclaves and affiliation with ethnic churches.[58]

The survey results also indicate that the gender gap in household chores and childcare narrows but remains significant among the 1.5 generation. However, gender differences among second-and-later generations in household chores and childcare are not significant, suggesting a more equitable gender division of labor in these household roles.

Another meaningful finding is that there seems to be no significant gender differences in terms of primary responsibility for eldercare (43.5% for men vs. 37.4% for women). This pattern is similar among the 1.5 and second

or later generation men, as 45.6% report being primarily responsible for elder care while 35.9% of women were primarily responsible.

This finding needs to be interpreted with some caution given the smaller subsample answering the eldercare item (n = 631), and considering that these figures describe sole/primary responsibility only, not overall involvement. With this caveat, the survey results suggest that a substantial proportion of respondents, especially men across generations, assume the primary role of eldercare at home.

Beyond the household, about one in five respondents (20.9%) also serves as a regular physical or financial caregiver for someone outside their own household, with no significant difference by gender or by immigrant generation. Altogether, these patterns are consistent with evidence on the strength of intergenerational relations (e.g., extended-family structure and caregiving) documented among Asian Americans, especially Korean Americans.[59]

The U.S. Military service

Overall, 4.9% of respondents reported a history of U.S. military service with 7.7% of men having served, compared to 2.5% of women. In addition, a notable percentage of respondents reported indirect family ties with the U.S. military, with 11.7% reporting one family member with military service, 5.4% reporting two, and 2.7% reporting three or more. This results in about one in five Korean American families having some connection with the U.S. military service.

POLITICS AND CIVIC PARTICIPATION

The survey presents a snapshot of Korean American political ideology and participation both in the United States and in South Korea. Specifically, it demonstrates self-reported political attitudes, voter registration, 2024 presidential candidate support, interest in South Korean politics, political party affiliation, primary news sources, language usage for news consumption, and involvement in community organizations.




Figure 19. Self-Reported Political Attitudes (N=1,466)

When asked to describe their political attitudes about American politics, Korean American respondents were fairly evenly distributed across the spectrum, though more than one-third of all respondents identified as moderate (36.7%). The remaining respondents were divided nearly evenly between liberal (31.2%) and conservative (32.1%), with relatively few positioning themselves at either ideological pole.

The data challenges the common understanding that individuals with higher educational attainment tend to hold more liberal views than those with less education.

These results are in line with previous findings about Asian Americans from a nationwide survey and a regional survey.[60] Although this survey did not ask Korean Americans about their party affiliation, other studies have underscored one of the most enduring features of Asian American partisanship, that a large proportion of them are non-affiliated or independent voters, standing at approximately 30% among Asian Americans overall and 43% among Korean American voters.[61]




Figure 20. Political Attitudes by Educational Attainments (N=1,466)

Similar to the breakdown by generation, the distribution of political attitudes across educational attainment exhibits a consistent pattern. Moderate self-identification is most pronounced across education levels, accounting for 31% among those with less than a high school education, peaking at 43.5% among high school or GED graduates, and steadily declining across higher attainment tiers, such as 40% for those with some college, 35.8% for bachelor's degree holders, and 29.6% for advanced degree holders.

Importantly, this reduction in moderates among highly educated respondents did not yield a corresponding shift toward liberalism. Instead, respondents holding bachelor's or advanced degrees were more evenly dispersed across the political spectrum. Among bachelor's degree holders, 32.7% identified as liberal and 31.5% as conservative; for advanced degree holders, these figures were 34.3% and 36.1%, respectively. Thus, higher education in this sample of Korean Americans correlates with greater ideological divergence away from the political center.

The data challenges the common understanding that individuals with higher educational attainment tend to hold more liberal views than those with less education.[62] In fact, emerging studies have called for a more nuanced approach to understanding how conservatism operates, as one that separates cultural conservatism from fiscal conservatism.

Recent studies show that highly educated individuals actually tend to be less supportive of redistribution of wealth.[63] While education may foster socially progressive attitudes, it can also cultivate economic self-interest and a desire for reduced state reliance, which is linked to taxation.

Furthermore, previous studies have demonstrated a correlation between Republican identification among Asian Americans and the internalization of the "model minority" stereotype, which emphasizes self-reliance, meritocracy, and independence from government assistance.[64] These findings also make a connection between small business ownership and political conservatism.[65]

Whether these patterns hold true for Korean Americans specifically, and Asian Americans broadly, remains an important empirical question.

Voter Registration

Voting-eligible citizens comprised 70.8% of total survey respondents. Among this eligible group, 88.1% reported being registered to vote. This is a significantly higher level of voter registration than previously noted, as voter registration has often been mentioned as a challenge to Korean Americans' political participation.[66]

In 2024, the voter registration rate of Asian Americans was estimated to be 65.3%.[67] The available data on Korean American voter registration rates provided by Korean American civic organizations indicate state-level voter registration rates ranging between 38% and 68%.[68]

Table 5. Top 10 States for Korean American Registered Voters (N=915)

Rank	State	Percent
1	California	31.4%
2	New York	7.8%
3	New Jersey	7.0%
4	Virginia	5.2%
5	Florida	4.4%
6	Michigan	4.2%
7	Pennsylvania	4.0%
8	Washington	3.8%
9	Texas	3.8%
10	Illinois	3.3%
	Subtotal	**75.0%**

Table 6. Distribution of Registered Voters by Census Region and Leading State (N=915)

Region	Percent	Top State
West	40.4%	California
Midwest	12.4%	Michigan
Northeast	22%	New York
South	25.2%	Virginia

Registered voters were geographically dispersed nationwide, though 75% were concentrated within the top ten states with the most Korean American populations. Unsurprisingly, California accounted for the largest share (31.4%), followed by New York (7.8%), New Jersey (7%), and Virginia (5.2%), a pattern consistent with broader Korean American population distribution. Notably, Texas, which ranked fourth in the 2022 analysis by AAPI Data,[69] fell to ninth position in this sample.

Regionally, the West held the highest concentration of registered voters (40.4%), primarily driven by California. The South (25.2%) slightly exceeded the Northeast (22%), largely reflecting notable registration shares in states such as Florida (ranked 5th) and Georgia (ranked 12th).

Korean American Support for 2024 Presidential Candidates




Figure 21. 2024 Presidential Candidate Preference among Registered Voters (N=915)

Candidate preferences in the 2024 presidential election reflected a general Democratic leaning among Korean Americans, consistent with historical patterns. Among the surveyed registered voters, 47.9% of respondents supported Kamala Harris, while 33.8% favored Donald Trump. However, a sizable proportion expressed no opinion (17.6%), indicating lower overall candidate commitment compared to broader benchmark data, such as the 2024 AAPI Voter Survey,[70] where support among registered Korean American voters reached 60% for Harris and 35% for Trump.

Conventionally, much of the literature highlights that Asian American political affiliations generally lean toward the Democratic Party, with Vietnamese Americans as a notable exception,[71] and Korean Americans have historically supported Democratic presidential candidates.[72] However, current indicators suggest that the Korean American vote cannot be taken for granted by either party.




Figure 22. 2024 Presidential Candidate Support by Gender (N=907)

An examination of candidate preference by gender reveals a divergence that is particularly pronounced among female voters. Korean American women supported Kamala Harris over Donald Trump by a nearly two-to-one margin (52.8% and 26.9%). Korean American men, by contrast, were evenly divided: 43.5% favored Harris and 41.4% Trump, a difference within the sampling error.

The Korean American gender gap of Harris to Trump, with the margin being roughly 25 points among women against a statistical tie among men, is among the largest differences among genders in any of the questions in this survey.

Transnational Political Engagement




Figure 23. Korean Political Party Support among Korean Americans (N=1,568)

Note: Multiple responses were allowed.

From the beginning of Korean immigration to the United States, maintaining ties to their homeland's politics has been an important part of the Korean American community building.[73] In the contemporary period, innovations in transportation and communication, as well as South Korea's policies that allow overseas Koreans' political participation promoted robust transnational political engagement, or maintaining political relations and identities in their country of origin.[74]

Nearly seven in ten Korean American respondents (71.2%) in this survey indicated that they are interested in or familiar with Korean politics, although nearly one in three (28.9%) reported no preference for any Korean political party.

The Democratic Party of Korea, which is currently in power under President Lee Jay Myung, received the highest level of support among respondents (21.6%), followed by the People Power Party (7.3%), the Rebuilding Korea Party (6.1%), the Progressive Party (5.9%), and the Reform Party (2.9%).

While the current ruling party in Korea has the strongest support among the political parties listed in this survey, a substantial number of Korean Americans responded that they do not identify with any specific Korean political party.




Figure 24. Primary Sources of Political News (N=3,611)

Note: Multiple responses were allowed.

Korean American respondents report relying on a wide range of media for political news. Television (24.0%) and social media (21.8%) serve as the leading sources for news consumption, followed by digital news platforms (12.8%), print newspapers (10.4%), and video streaming (10.4%). Notably, 12.6% of respondents rely on informal networks outside of conventional media, including interpersonal, community, or religious organizations.

Although not shown in the figure, breaking these patterns down by generations reveals that social media was the leading news source for second and later generation respondents (25.01%), closely followed by television (24.1%).




Figure 25. Language Preference for Political News (N=1,316)

Korean Americans' political news consumption favors English-language media. Over half of respondents (55.6%) consume news predominantly in English, including 40.5% who rely on English almost exclusively. By contrast, 26.2% of the respondents consume news in both languages equally, and only 10.7% rely predominantly on Korean-language outlets, with 7.5% use Korean almost exclusively.




Figure 26. Language used in News Consumption by Generation (N=1,316)

Language preferences for political news shift dramatically across generations. The overall movement toward English media is primarily driven by the 1.5, second, and later generations, of whom 47.8% and 55.4% consume news exclusively in English, respectively. Conversely, while 34.8% of first-generation respondents rely mostly or almost exclusively on Korean media, this group displays the highest level of bilingual news consumption (35.1%).

Notably, this strong dual-language usage persists among first-generation respondents, reflecting high overall bilingual proficiency across the population.




Figure 27. Participation in Korean Community Organization (N=1,466)




Figure 28. Participation in Non-Korean Community Organization (N=1,466)

To gauge Korean Americans' level of civic engagement, respondents were asked about the frequency of their participation in Korean and non-Korean community organizations. Overall levels of engagement are modest in both cases, with substantial shares reporting no participation at all. Among those who do participate, involvement in both types of organizations leans toward frequent engagement.

Attending "a few times a year" is the modal category for participants, at 22.1% for Korean organizations and 28.5% for non-Korean organizations. At the same time, roughly one-third of respondents participate at least monthly in Korean organizations (32.3%), a slightly higher share than the 29.1% who do so in non-Korean organizations.

Regular involvement, as in weekly or more, is similarly uncommon for both. The distributions are more or less similar, showing that respondents' community engagement does not differ dramatically in terms of the ethnic composition of the organization, though the slightly greater concentration of frequent participation in Korean organizations hints at deeper embeddedness in co-ethnic institutions for a subset of this sample.

RELIGION

An old saying states: "When Chinese go abroad, they open restaurants. When Japanese go abroad, they open factories. When Koreans go abroad, they start churches." Religion has been, and remains, a key institution in Korean American life.[75]

In one of the largest representative surveys of Asian Americans in 2012, Korean Americans stood apart from other Asian ethnic groups for the majority affiliation with Christianity (61% Protestant and 10% Catholic).[76] But in the Pew Research Center's latest representative oversample survey of Asian Americans, Korean American Protestants are now only a plurality at 46%. The additional 11% of Catholic Korean Americans makes Christianity the dominant religion overall among Koreans in the United States.[77]

The results of this survey largely confirms this finding that Protestantism has declined in representation. However, the respondents were shown a list of different religious affiliation options compared to the Pew Research Center survey. Notably, including options such as "spiritual but not religious" (SBNR) allowed respondents to select more than one affiliation.

These additional options in the questions yielded several surprising findings. First, while the Pew Research Center's Protestant rate was about 46%, this survey rate dropped to 42%. That lower percentage was joined by another lower rate found among those who selected "Atheist" or "Agnostic" (11%) or "No religious preference" (12%). For Pew this set of responses was labeled "religiously unaffiliated" and accounted for 34% of Korean Americans in their 2023 survey sample. The Korean American survey had a rate of about 23% when combined with the non-affiliation responses.

Further, Pew's Korean American Buddhist sample was about 3% and another 5% affiliated with other religions. This survey yielded 9% who identified as Buddhist, 3% with other religions, and almost 2% who identified with multiple religions.

Additionally, nearly 10% of the sampled Korean American respondents responded with SBNR. These findings suggest that there is an important subpopulation of Korean Americans who are less comfortable with traditional Christian religious affiliation and prefer terms that allow for more personalized views of faith.

Importantly, the ambiguous category of the "religiously unaffiliated" is also reduced because of the inclusion of SBNR.

Attending and participating in religious communities is a common means of religious expression, which this survey asked about. To simplify the findings to the question about the approximate frequency with which they participated in religious services or rituals, the answers were combined to three levels: no attendance ("never"), infrequent attendance ("once a year" to "once a month"), and frequent attendance ("twice a month or more").

The survey found that nearly 73% of Korean Americans, regardless of affiliation, attended some kind of religious gathering or community at least once a year. More than 31% attended such communities twice a month or more, a rate that is higher than the average American churchgoer.

When the responses were disaggregated by religious affiliation, no specific group among Korean Americans fits the average profile. For example, while 31% of all Korean Americans attend religious services twice a month or more, 48% of Protestants reported this level of participation, the highest of all religious subgroups of Korean Americans.

Nearly 42% of all Korean Americans attend services and religious gatherings between once a year and once a month, but over 51% of Catholics, and over 55% of Buddhists did so. And while 27% of Korean Americans report never attending any religious gatherings, over 76% of atheists and agnostics and 55% of those with no religion never attended.

By extension, this also means that 23% and 45% of those with no religious affiliation attended a religious gathering at least once in the past year. This suggests that religious community gathering and practice is important for many Korean Americans, even when affiliation is not a prominent feature of their identity.




Figure 29. Religious Affiliation Distribution of Korean Americans (N=1,466)

The survey asked for an additional characteristic of religious communities which was not asked in the Pew Asian American Survey of 2023. Religious community attenders were asked about the perceived ethnic/racial makeup of the community with which they attend.

Notably, almost 41% of all Korean American religious attenders were in communities that were mostly Korean. Another 5% were in predominantly Asian (but not Korean) religious communities, nearly 15% were in predominantly white religious communities, and over 35% were in racially mixed religious communities.

While 31% of all Korean Americans attend religious services twice a month or more, 48% of Protestants reported this level of participation, the highest of all religious subgroups of Korean Americans.




Figure 30. Religious Service Attendance by Religious Affiliation (N=1,466)

Of the traditional religious affiliations, Korean American Buddhists share a similar racial composition profile as the average of all attenders. About 46% were in predominantly Korean religious communities, 39% were in racially mixed communities, 6.5% were in majority white communities.

Korean American Protestant Christian attenders similarly had the largest percentage in predominantly Korean religious communities, followed by racially mixed (28%) and mostly white (20%) communities. Of all the religious subgroups Protestants had the highest percentage in mostly white religious communities.

Korean American Catholics were distinctive in reporting the highest percentage in racially mixed religious communities (47% compared to 35% for all Korean religious attenders). These analyses reveal that while religious communities have often been thought of as a hub for ethnic solidarity among Korean Americans this may apply less in the contemporary era compared to previous decades.

In addition, most Korean American religious attenders (with the exception of Protestant Christians and Buddhists) more often participate in racially mixed religious spaces even among those who have no religious affiliation but still participate. Religious institutional participation remains an important organizational space for Korean Americans but many experience this spiritual community in racially diverse religious spaces today.




Figure 31. Congregational Ethnic/Racial Composition among Attenders by Individual Religious Affiliation (N=1,071)

The survey findings also reveal interesting trends among generations of respondents. Limiting the analysis to three main racial compositions shows a change taking place generationally. Among the first generation, 52% of Protestants, 42% of Catholics and 49% of Buddhists were in majority Korean religious communities.

In the 1.5 generation, 45% of Protestants, 34% of Catholics, and 44% of Buddhists are in majority Korean religious communities. And among the second generation, 38% of Protestants, 26% of Catholics, 30% of Buddhists are in majority Korean religious communities.

This suggests that successive generations of religious Korean Americans are less present in Korean religious communities, and Korean Protestants are retaining a larger percentage of their second generation attenders.

For Catholics, perhaps surprisingly, more than 50% of the first-generation report attending a religious community that is racially mixed. Similarly, the majority of the Korean American Catholic second generation is in a racially mixed religious community (52%).

For Buddhists, a larger percentage of the first and 1.5 generation are in majority Korean religious communities but the largest presence of the second generation is in racially mixed religious communities.

Of all three of these religious affiliations, Protestants have the highest percentage attending majority white religious communities regardless of generation. About 22% of the first generation, 17% of the 1.5 generation, and 22% of the second generation Protestants reported attending a mostly white religious community.

This initial analysis suggests that the Korean-dominant religious community remains important for many, particularly for first-generation Protestants. But that importance declines with each successive generation. The analysis seems to be the same for Buddhists, but for Catholics, attendance at racially mixed religious communities is more the norm unlike any other religious affiliation among Korean Americans.

These findings present a complex religious landscape for Korean Americans. From religious affiliation preferences to patterns in attendance, and even in the ethnic/racial composition of their churches and temples there does not appear to be a monolithic religious culture as there was in decades past.




Figure 32. Religious Community Racial Composition by Generation among Protestant, Catholic, and Buddhist Korean Americans (N=816)

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ENDNOTES

1 This report defines the term "immigrant," "first," or "1.5" generation as anyone who was born outside of the United States who moved to America. "Second" or "second and later generations" refer to the children, grandchildren, and further descendants of the immigrant, or first, or 1.5 generation, all of whom were born in the United States. This report may also use this term interchangeably with "U.S.-born" throughout the report. (See data methods section below.)

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18 The margin of error of +/-2.48 percentage points means that, if the survey were repeated 100 times using the same sampling procedure, about 95 times

out of 100, a range of +/-2.48 percentage points around the survey estimate would contain the true figure for the full Korean American population.

19 Because these are weighted samples, the distributions reported in Table 1 should be mainly interpreted as describing the representation of Korean Americans used in the sample, rather than a substantive finding.

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21 Angie Y. Chung, *Legacies of Struggle: Conflict and Cooperation in Korean American Politics* (Stanford University Press, 2007).

22 Regional categories follow the U.S. Census categorization as follows:

Northeast: CT, ME, MA, NH, RI, VT, NJ, NY, PA

Midwest: IL, IN, MI, OH, WI, IA, KS, MN, MO, NE, ND, SD

South: DE, FL, GA, MD, NC, SC, VA, DC, WV, AL, KY, MS, TN, AR, LA, OK, TX

West: AK, AZ, CA, CO, HI, ID, MT, NV, NM, OR, UT, WA, WY

23 Preliminary. The estimates of foreign-born vs. U.S.-born respondents are undergoing verification and further analysis and it may be revised.

24 Includes participants who are born outside of the U.S. to American citizens.

25 Quintiles are approximate based on grouping fixed survey income brackets to best approximate equal-sized (20%) groups. Group sizes range from 14.7% to 25.1% due to fixed category boundaries.

26 See Taeku Lee, *The Multiple Faces of the National Korean American Community: Progress and Paradoxes* (The Council of Korean Americans, 2023), **https://ka.institute/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/2023-Taeku-Lee-CKA-Report.pdf**.

27 This survey question asks about disability or other chronic health conditions, while the ACS identifies through six-questions on hearing, vision, cognitive, ambulatory, self-care, and independent living difficulty. See Taeku Lee, *The Multiple Faces of the National Korean American Community: Progress and Paradoxes* (The Council of Korean Americans, 2023), **https://ka.institute/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/2023-Taeku-Lee-CKA-Report.pdf**.

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37 When the results are shown by gender, respondents who prefer not to disclose (0.3%) are excluded from the analysis.

38 Carolyne Im, "Facts about Koreans in the U.S.," Asian Americans, *Pew Research Center*, May 1, 2025, https://www.pewresearch.org/race-and-ethnicity/fact-sheet/asian-americans-koreans-in-the-u-s/.

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40 See Gender and Family section for related patterns in language use; see also Im, "Facts about Koreans in the U.S."

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42 Lim and Jeong define the first generation as those who were foreign-born and immigrated to the U.S. at age 13 or older, while the second and later generations are defined as those who were U.S.-born or immigrated to the U.S. before age 13. They also classify those who are unemployed or out of the labor force as "not employed." In their analysis, they exclude those in self-employment and family business.

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